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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CONNIE LEE ROBERTS 
f/k/a CONNIE LEE DONITHORNE 
Plain tiff-Respondent 
vs. 
DENNIS DuWAYNE DONITHORNE 
Defendant-Appellant 
Case No. 890347-CA 
Category No. 7 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this domestic 
relations matter pursuant to U.C.A. Section 78-2a-3(2)(g). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from an Order and Judgement of the Fourth Judicial 
District Court, Judge Boyd L. Park presiding, in which 1) the Court included 
a provision that the Appellant not harass the Respondent when telephoning the 
minor children, 2) Appellant was ordered by the lower court not to participate 
in any of the special activities of the parties children, and 3) ordered 
Appellant to pay Respondent's attorney's fees. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
If A). Did the trial court err when it failed to make any findings of fact 
or conclusions of law relative to the issue of including a provision that 
Appellant's not harass Respondent when telephoning the minor children? 
(B). Given the facts known to the trial court, did the trial court err 
when it included in its order a provision that Appellant's not harass 
Respondent when telephoning the minor children? 
11(A). Did the trial court err when it failed to make any findings 
of fact or conclusions of law relative to the issue of restricting Appellant from 
participating in any of the children's special activities? 
(B). Given the facts known to the trial court, did the trial court err 
when it restricted Appellant from participating in any of the children's special 
activities? 
III(A).Did the trial court err when it failed to make any findings of fact 
or conclusions of law relative to the issue of Appellant paying Respondent's 
attorney's fees? 
(B). Given the facts known to the trial court, did the trial court 
err when it ordered Appellant to pay Respondent's attorney's fees? 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal from a final Order and Judgement entered after a 
trial in the Fourth District Court, Judge Boyd L. Park presiding, in which the 
lower court 1) included a provision in its order that Appellant not harass 
Respondent when telephoning the parties minor children, 2) ordered that 
Appellant not participate in the special activities of the minor children, and 3) 
ordered Appellant to pay Respondent's attorney fees. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
A Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage was originally issued by the 
Superior Court of California in the County of Contra Costa on April 15, 1986 
and custody of the minor children awarded to Respondent. Respondent filed 
a Petition to Reduce Foreign Decree to Judgment in January, 1988 in the 
Fourth District Court of the State of Utah and Appellant filed there an 
Answer and a Counter Claim in February, 1988 alleging a substantial change 
of circumstances and that custody be awarded to him. Appellant filed an 
Order to Show Cause for a specific visitation schedule in September, 1988 and 
moved to Utah in October, 1988. Respondent filed an Amended Petition to 
Reduce Foreign Decree to Judgment in December, 1988 through new counsel. 
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A pre-trial hearing was held on April 29, 1988 on the issue of 
jurisdiction. A trial was held on February 7, 1989 on the issues of 
Respondent's Amended Petition and Appellant's Motion for a specific visitation 
schedule. 
C. Lower Court Disposition. 
At the pre-trial hearing the court found it had jurisdiction over the 
issues of custody and visitation but deferred to California the issues of child 
support and alimony. 
At trial on February 7, 1989 the court found jurisdiction to award 
ongoing child support. On the 29th of April, 1989, the trial court entered an 
Order and Judgment in which it ruled that, 
The Defendant is entitled to telephone visitation 
with the minor children which conversation shall not 
exceed 15 minutes and there shall be no harassment of 
the Plaintiff. 
The Plaintiff is to advise the Defendant as to 
any special activities that the children are involved 
in but he is not to participate in those activities 
but has the right to observe them. 
Plaintiff is granted judgment against the Defendant 
in the sum of $1,800.00 representing a reasonable 
attorney's fee incurred in this matter. 
/// 
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Defendant was ordered to pay to Plaintiff the sum of $293.00 per month 
as ongoing child support based on the Child Support Guidelines and 
Defendant's request for extended visitation was reserved by the court pending 
his showing evidence to the court of a compatible work schedule. 
No Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law were prepared pursuant to 
this Decision. This appeal ensued on the orders quoted above. 
D. Statement of Facts. 
The parties in this matter were married on December 30, 1976. Two 
children, Ryan Tully Donithorne, born July 28, 1980, and Jason David 
Donithorne, born November 8, 1982, were born as issue of this marriage. The 
parties separated in April, 1985. A judgment of dissolution of marriage was 
entered on April 15, 1986 by the Superior Court of California in the County 
of Contra Costa and custody of the minor children awarded to Respondent. 
Respondent secretly relocated with the children to Utah in May of 1985, 
one month following their separation and prior to even any temporary order 
of custody being granted her. Subsequent to the parties separation Appellant 
was refused any visitation with the children by Respondent, except during a 
brief afternoon while Respondent and the children returned to California for a 
meeting with Contra Costa County mediation personnel. Such visitation was 
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only permitted under the supervision of Respondent and her sister-in-law, Becky 
Roberts, who traveled from Utah with her. 
The judgment of dissolution entered on April 15, 1986, provided 
Appellant the right of reasonable visitation and specifically included four weeks 
during the summer of 1986 and one-half of Christmas vacation, Thanksgiving 
and spring break during odd years to Appellant. Notwithstanding said order, 
Respondent refused to allow Appellant any visitation whatsoever for a period 
of approximately three years. The first opportunity Appellant was next given 
to visit the children was during his four day stay in Utah as ordered by 
Judge Boyd L. Park at pre-trial hearing on April 29, 1988. 
During the numerous approximate weekly attempts by Appellant to speak 
with the children by telephone during the previous three years Respondent 
refused to allow Appellant to speak with the children more than once per 
month. To overcome this problem, Judge Park specifically ordered at the pre-
trial hearing that Appellant have unlimited telephone contact with the children. 
No provision that there be no harassment of Respondent when Appellant 
telephoned the children was included in the pre-trial order. 
For the first time since the parties separation, Appellant enjoyed 
visitation with the children under the same pre-trial order for a period of six 
weeks with the children the following summer. 
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Due to Appellants desire to spend more time with his children on a 
regular basis and be actively involved in their lives as he had been prior to 
the parties separation, he elected to relocate to Pleasant Grove, Utah in 
October, 1988. A hearing on Appellant's Order to Show Cause was convened 
on October 20, 1988 on his motion for extended visitation during the regular 
days and times Respondent was working during the evening. Domestic 
relations commissioner, Howard Maetani, restricted Appellant's telephone contact 
with the children to once per week. Appellant objected to the commissioner's 
recommendation and Judge Park reinstated Appellants desire for as much as 
daily telephone contact with the children at trial on February 7, 1989. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I -- THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT 
MAKE ANY FINDINGS OF FACT OR CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
UPON WHICH TO BASE ITS RULING THAT INCLUDED AN 
UNNECESSARY PROVISION THAT THERE BE NO HARASSMENT 
OF PLAINTIFF WHEN DEFENDANT TELEPHONES THE MINOR 
CHILDREN AND FURTHER ERRED IN ISSUING ITS RULING 
CONTAINING SUCH PROVISION. 
The heart and core of Appellant's appeal, and his central concern, is that 
the trial court failed wholely to make any findings of fact or conclusions of 
law whatsoever which evidence the thought and reasoning process of the trial 
court. 
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Underlying the Appellant's position is this notion: A person has a right 
to know the process bv which the court considered the evidence and formed 
conclusions from the evidence. It is the function of the trial court to make 
findings of fact to reveal the court's thought process. A litigant has the "right 
to know" the process by which the court considered the evidence and the 
points of law and formed its conclusions based thereon. 
On this point the Utah Supreme Court ruled in Christiansen v. 
Christiansen. 667 P.2d 592 in citing Chandler v. West 610 P.2d 1299, 1301 
(Utah, 1980) as follows: 
The making of formal findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, whether the motion is granted 
or denied, materially assists the parties in 
determining whether there may be a basis for appeal, 
and if an appeal is taken, significantly assists 
this court in its review. 
On this same point the Utah Supreme Court later ruled in Pennington 
b. Pennington. 711 P.2d 254 lUtah, 1985), 
We acknowledge that the findings are meager, and 
strongly advise respondent's attorney, who drafted 
them, to take the necessary effort in the future to 
prepare more specific and substantive findings. 
We cannot overemphasize the importance of well 
written findings to support modifications of 
divorce decrees. See Tuckev v, Tuckev, Utah, 
649 P.2d 88 (1982). "One of the reasons for 
this requirement is to explain the basis for the 
modification so the aggrieved party can determine 
whether to challenge it and so the appellate court 
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can properly review it on appeal." Shioii v. Shioii. 
Utah, 671 P.2d 135, 136 (1983). Conclusory findings 
give little indication of the trial court's reasons 
for reaching its result. Such findings may invite 
unnecessary expensive appeals which in turn delay 
final resolution of the issues and impede judicial 
economy. 
In the case of Acton v. J.B. Deliran. 58 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 9 (Utah, 
1987), the Utah Supreme Court repeated the principles under which a trial 
court's findings of fact are deemed sufficient. In Acton, the court ruled, 
The findings of fact must show that the court's 
judgment or decree follows logically from and is 
supported by, the evidence.' The findings should be 
sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary 
facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate 
conclusion on each factual issue was reached.'" 
(Citing Smith v. Smith, at 426 and Rucker v. Dalton, 
598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah, 1979). 
We do not mean that the trial court was incorrect, 
but only that the issues are for the trial court to 
decide and that the findings of fact must reveal how 
the court resolved each material issue.... Acton at 9 
In Acton, the Court concluded that the finding therein had been 
inadequate and that the case should be remanded for entry of proper findings. 
In Smith, it was held by the Utah Supreme Court that the findings of 
fact rendered by the trial court, 
[Did] not pass muster since they simply [did] not demonstrate 
a rational factual basis for the ultimate decision by reference to 
pertinent factors that relate to the best interest of the child, 
including specific attributes of the parents. Smith, at 426. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that 
In all actions tried upon the facts without a 
jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find 
the facts specially and state separately its conclusions 
of law thereon,...It will be sufficient if the findings 
of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and 
recorded in open court following the close of the evidence. 
Nevertheless, in this case the trial court made no finding of facts or 
conclusions of law either in its written order or in its oral statements 
concerning the evidence presented relative to the necessity of the court 
including a provision in its order that there be no harassment of Plaintiff 
when Defendant telephones the minor children. 
The record is void of any proof whatsoever that Defendant has ever 
harassed Plaintiff in any way, notwithstanding her allegations to that effect 
contained in her initial Petition. 
Defendant categorically denied in Paragraph 7 of his Answer to Plaintiffs 
initial Petition that any such harassment had ever occurred. Defendant further 
provided evidence in Paragraphs 2 & 3 of his Affirmative Defenses portion of 
his Answer that said allegations are sham pleas. 
Subsequently Defendant filed a counter-claim to Plaintiffs petition, 
wherein he again addressed the issue of telephone harassment. In Paragraph 
20 of his First Claim regarding interference with visitation and in Paragraph 
8 of his Second Claim regarding a substantial change of circumstances 
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warranting the change of custody, Defendant further supported his denial of 
harassment. 
Notwithstanding Defendant's categorical denial of making harassing phone 
calls Plaintiff reiterated such allegations in Paragraph 9 of her Amended 
Petition filed by new counsel. In addition, Plaintiff again falsely alleged that 
Defendant had molested her in the same paragraph, yet provided no evidence 
at trial of such concoction on her part. 
POINT II ~ THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT 
MAKE ANY FINDINGS OF FACT OR CONCLUSIONS OF LAW UPON 
WHICH TO BASE ITS RULING THAT APPELLANT IS NOT TO 
PARTICIPATE IN HIS CHILDREN'S SPECIAL ACTIVITIES AND 
FURTHER ERRED IN ISSUING SUCH RULING. 
All of the above arguments relative to the importance of the trial court 
making findings of fact and conclusions of law apply equally to this second 
issue. 
The record is silent as to any justification for restricting Appellant from 
participating in his children's special activities. Further, the trial court's order 
tha t Appellant is permitted to attend but not participate in his children's 
special activities is impractical. When he has gone to such activities he has 
been approached by others in attendance to engage in conversation and 
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participation which is difficult to refuse unless he is to be esteemed as anti-
social. To justify seemingly anti-social behavior he would be forced to refer to 
the order precluding such participation obtained by Respondent, which he would 
prefer not to do lest it be interpreted as publicly disparaging the character of 
Respondent. 
POINT III - THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT 
MAKE ANY FINDINGS OF FACT OR CONCLUSIONS OF LAW UPON 
WHICH TO BASE ITS RULING THAT APPELLANT IS TO PAY 
RESPONDENT'S ATTORNEYS FEES AND FURTHER ERRED IN 
ISSUING ITS RULING THAT APPELLANT PAY THE SAME. 
All of the arguments under Point I relative to the importance of the 
trial court making findings of fact and conclusions of law apply equally to this 
third issue. 
In Asper v. Aspen 81 Utah Adv. Rep. 43 (5/4/88) the Utah Court of 
Appeals remanded the case to the trial court to make a specific finding of 
need before an award of attorney's fees could be determined, where the 
plaintiff wife sought an award of attorney's fees. 
Plaintiff did not show that her attorney's fees are reasonable. In Beals 
v. Beals» 682 P.2d 862 (Utah 1984), the Supreme Court of Utah ruled, 
In divorce cases, awards of attorney's fees must be supported 
by evidence which shows that the requested award is reasonable. 
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In rendering its decision to reverse an award of attorney's fees in Beads, 
the court quoted its earlier decision in Kerr v. Kerr. 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah, 
1980) saying that, "Relevant factors of reasonableness include the necessity of 
the number of hours dedicated'." 
Plaintiffs counsel, failed to proffer at trial evidence of any kind as to 
"the necessity of the number of hours dedicated." 
Further, at no time during trial did Plaintiff allege that she was in 
financial need of her attorney's fees being awarded. The trial record is 
completely devoid of testimony by Plaintiff that she had inadequate resources 
to pay her own attorney's fees. 
In Beals (supra), the Utah Supreme Court also said, 
"...the party requesting the award must show financial 
need...Where reasonableness of the award or financial need have 
not been shown, we have reversed awards of attorney's fees." 
The same court ruled in Kallas v. Kallas. 614 P.2d 641 (Utah, 1980), 
that , 
...a proper determination of whether fees should be awarded 
and the amount, if any, cannot be made without an examination 
of the facts...Because there was no presentation of facts establishing 
defendants financial need accompanying the motion the award was 
inadequately supported. 
The decision of the trial court is reversed, and the case is 
remanded for reconsideration by the trial court in light of this 
opinion. 
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Plaintiffs counsel has demonstrated a lack of the requisite integrity to 
entitle Plaintiff to attorney's fees. 
In Kerr (supra), the court noted that, 
Inasmuch as this case is remanded for further proceedings, 
we deem it appropriate to make some observations about the 
method of proof of the value of attorneys' services. 
It is neither practical nor productive for the profession or for 
the public, to present the impression that compensation for a 
lawyer's services can always be gauged on a scale of dollars per 
hour. Perhaps this can be done as to many of the perfunctory 
services a lawyer performs, but his services in other areas may run 
the gamut of the complexities of the human condition. 
The choice of a lawyer, and the value of his services, may 
depend upon a number of factors, including his background of 
learning and experience, his ability, his integrity (emphasis added) 
and his dedication to the causes with which he identifies himself. 
Plaintiffs counsel has on two past occasions defrauded the court by 
purposely and knowingly misrepresenting Plaintiffs financial condition by 
alleging that she was "working at three job simultaneously," when if fact, he 
knew or had reason to believe otherwise. The two occasions were, first, at an 
Order to Show Cause hearing brought by Defendant regarding visitation before 
Commissioner Maetani on October 20, 1988 and second, at a hearing held on 
the Friday after Thanksgiving before Judge Boyd Park regarding visitation. 
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On both these occasions he testified that Plaintiff was in fact working three 
jobs simultaneously just to support herself and the children. 
The gist of his argument was to influence the court on both occasions 
not to grant the visitation sought by Defendant under the allegation that 
Plaintiff was only unavailable to the children during the visitation times sought 
by Defendant because of her having the work three jobs to support the 
children. Such a misrepresentation by Plaintiffs counsel was simply a lie and 
Plaintiffs counsel knew or should have known at the time he made said 
misrepresentation that it was a lie. 
Plaintiff counsel's reputation for being unnecessarily litigious, 
argumentative when in court, and uncooperative in negotiating settlement 
supports that the award of attorney's fees be reversed. 
In Kerr, (supra) the Utah Supreme Court noted that, "Also to be 
considered,11 in deciding an award of attorney's fees, "is the reputation he [or 
she] has acquired,..." (emphasis added). 
The reputation of Plaintiffs counsel among his peers supports that he is 
extremely difficult to work with. He is well known for being unnecessarily 
litigious, argumentative in court when examining and cross-examining witnesses, 
and especially uncooperative in making efforts to negotiate settlement of the 
issues between opposing parties. He rather prides himself regarding his 
litigation skills of advocacy. 
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Defendant has repeatedly suggested to Plaintiffs counsel that both parties 
best interest and those of the children would be best served by an attempt by 
both sides to negotiate the settlement of the numerous issues on which they 
are opposed. Plaintiffs counsel has consistently refused to negotiate with 
Defendant, preferring instead to unnecessarily occupy the court's time to resolve 
many small matters which likely could have been voluntarily worked out better 
between the parties to everyone's best interest other than Plaintiff counsel's 
own financial interest. 
The Kerr case further does not support the reasonableness of the 
necessity of the number of hours Plaintiffs counsel alleges to have dedicated 
to achieve the results obtained for Plaintiff at trial. 
Well in advance of the trial Defendant wrote Plaintiffs counsel and made 
a proposal for settlement regarding the issues heard at trial on February 7, 
1989. Although counsel alleged that he would submit the proposal to Plaintiff, 
such was not done. Notwithstanding counsel's promise to submit the proposal 
counsel made no effort whatsoever to respond on behalf of Plaintiff to 
Defendant's proposal, preferring instead to employ his legal prowess at trial. 
Further, when Plaintiffs counsel proffered testimony as to the number 
of hours he had spent, there was no indication that the 20 hours allegedly 
spent, were spent specifically on the issues heard at trial that day. In fact, 
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Defendant rather believes that Plaintiffs counsel simply cited the total number 
of hours he and supposedly spent on the case to date, as though all the time 
spent and been relevant to the issues argues that day. 
CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding the deference which the Court of Appeals gives to the 
trial court in family law matters, The Court of Appeals is free, especially 
where findings of fact and conclusions of law as absent in the trial record, 
to review questions of law and fact and to make findings of its own. 
Pennington v. Pennington. 711 P.2d 254, 257 (Utah, 1985). 
In Acton, the Court concluded that the findings therein had been 
inadequate and that the case should be remanded for entry of proper findings. 
Wherefore, Appellant seeks that this case be so remanded. In the 
alternative, Appellant request the Court of Appeals make findings of its own 
based upon the evidence in the record. 
The record sustains that there is no need that there be a provision that 
Appellant not harass Respondent during telephone conversations with the 
children. 
Further, the record sustains that there is no reason to preclude 
Appellant from participating in the special activities of the children. 
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And last the record does not support that Appellant be required to pay 
Respondent's attorney's fees neither at the trial level or on this appeal. 
Appellant does not have the financial resources to hire an attorney at either 
level. He has spent approximately 85 hours in preparing this brief. He has 
lost the opportunity to be otherwise gainfully employed during the 85 hours 
he has spent to prepare it. It is certainly appropriate that Respondent bear 
her own legal costs in responding thereto. 
\ 
DENNIS DONITlfoRNE 
Appellant, in Pro Se 
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